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1 Introduction
1 1  The contested historical origins of the notion of human 
dignity
The rise of the notion of “human dignity” as a basis for the modern conception of 
human rights is currently being hotly debated. As is the case with research into the 
historical roots of an idea of human rights in general, the origin of the notion is very 
much tied to its definition,1 for how one defines something also determines what 
its origins are and vice versa. For human dignity, this means distinguishing it from 
dignity as such, even though the line between the two notions seems arbitrary at best.
1 As shown in the recent volume on Revisiting the Origins of Human Rights (Halme-Tuomisaari & 
Slotte (Cambridge) 2015), to which the author has contributed.
* Post-doctoral researcher at the University of Helsinki. This article is written in the context of the
ERC-project “Reinventing the Foundations of European Legal Culture” (foundlaw.org, project
code: 313100). The author wishes to thank Heta Björklund for her kind assistance and editorial
prowess.
233
EXISTIMATIO AS “HUMAN DIGNITY” IN LATE-CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW
In a recent work, Waldron has defined “human dignity” as “levelling-up”, 
indicating the process by which privileges that were previously tied to a certain 
status or rank now are accorded equally to everyone.2 The advantage of this 
definition is that it is all-encompassing in the sense of taking into account its primary 
legal, political, theological and philosophical aspects. For instance, “levelling-up” 
covers both the legal definition of human dignity as it occurs in the constitutions of 
Germany and South-Africa3 as well as its formulation as a value by, for example, 
Kant.4 In this sense the debate between Whitman, who advocates at the very least a 
relatively law-based definition of the notion of “dignity”,5 and Moyn emphasising 
its pre-war Catholic roots,6 is a paradox if the idea of “levelling-up” is taken as the 
defining characteristic of human dignity. However, considering the relation between 
the definition and origin of a historical concept, by identifying human dignity with 
a general new-found independence from status or rank, is it possible to extend or 
otherwise argue for a specific historical origin for a notion of human dignity?
As such, the first historical text in which dignitas is used to a certain extent 
in the sense of “human dignity” is Cicero’s theory of the various personae in De 
officiis 1 105-107.7 One of these personae is the persona of reason, which all men 
share and which sets us apart from animals.8 However, the dignity man should 
embrace according to Cicero is not something that is to be protected against outside 
interference or violations, but rather consists of living properly in the Stoic sense, 
that is, in moderation and abstaining from all manner of luxury and overindulgence.9 
In other words, even though Cicero relates the notions of persona and dignitas to one 
another, and indicates there is such a thing as a rational persona typical to all human 
beings, dignitas in Cicero’s De officiis is an obligation, not a right. In general, whereas 
persona in the Roman era gradually developed into a more inclusive notion,10 the 
connotation of dignitas remained one of social status or standing, not the dignity of 
“man as such”.11 It was only in the late fifteenth century that dignitas would obtain 
the meaning of “dignity” in this latter sense. The literature then refers to works by 
Pico della Mirandola (1486) and Von Pufendorf (1672), still undoubtedly building 
2 Waldron 2012: 21, 33-36 and passim.
 3 Idem 18-19, 27-28 and 48-49, citing the first chapter of the South-African Constitution (1996) 
under 1: “The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the 
following values: (a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human 
rights and freedoms (…).”
 4 Idem 2012: 23-26.
5 Whitman 2003: 243-266; Whitman 2004: 1151-1221.
6 Moyn 2014: 19-33; Moyn 2015: 25-64. Also, Waldron 2012: 27-28.
7 Gaudemet 1995: 110; Cancik 2002: 19-39; Cancik 2005: 94-96. See, also, Bloch 1977: 25-37; and 
for a more general view, Rist 1982: esp 145-152.
 8 Cic Off 1 107; Cancik 2005: 96.
 9 Cic Off 1 105; Cancik 2005: 95.
10 For example, Pessers 2005: 15-21; van Beers 2009: 53-67; and Stagl 2012: 89-109.
11 On the problem of the various meanings of “dignity”, see Waldron 2012: 15-19.
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on Cicero and other ancient sources.12 However, the problem remains whether the 
Romans themselves actually knew and acknowledged “human dignity”. The concept 
is not in any obvious way engrained in the notion of dignitas, whether understood in 
the sense of social status or moral obligation. This is made all the more uncomfortable 
by the relation between the notions of persona and dignitas in Cicero: How can 
the concept of persona have developed into a more inclusive notion, while dignitas 
was and remained concerned with social status and moral obligation instead of the 
dignity of “man as such”?
One answer to this question might be that for indicating “human dignity”, 
the Romans actually used a term different from dignitas. There is some reason to 
suppose this. In the legal writings of the sixteenth century “dignity” for the first 
time is conceived of – to some degree – as “human dignity” as a right instead of an 
obligation. The French humanist jurist Donellus (1527-1591) in his Commentarii de 
iure civili (1589) formulates an early theory of subjective rights one has on his own 
person, the suum in persona ipsa.13 These “personality rights” are the rights to life, 
body, liberty and dignity.14 The remarkable thing about these “personality rights” is 
their independence from concepts of status or social standing. According to Donellus 
everyone has these rights regardless of one’s position or role in society. As such, their 
formulation constitutes a breach with the earlier tradition of subjective rights as rights 
solely related to social class.15 Therefore, the catalogue is of major importance for 
the consecutive development of the notion of subjective rights. Moreover, it appears 
that Donellus refers to specific Roman legal texts in formulating these “personality 
rights”, which is not that strange considering that the Commentarii de iure civili 
is basically a systematisation of (received) Roman law.16 For instance, violations 
of these “personality rights” are punished by means of actiones derived from the 
Roman law of tort or delict, primarily the actio iniuriarum.17 They are even seen as 
a more or less logical corollary to the Roman order of actiones from delict, to the 
point that Donellus wonders why the Digest did not contain a similar catalogue of 
personality rights.18 Furthermore, in stating these personality rights, Donellus refers 
to several Roman legal sources directly. For instance, when discussing his “right to 
freedom” libertas is defined as facere quae velimus, derived from the famous text 
of Florentinus on libertas as a facultas naturalis.19 But with regard to his “right to 
dignity”, Donellus does something quite noteworthy: Instead of stating that a “right 
12 Cancik 2005: 95-96.
13 Waider 1961.
14 Idem 60-61; eg in Donellus Commentarii de iure civili (1589) 2 8 3 at 229-230 of the 1762 Opera 
omnia-edition (Waider 1961: 52 n 1); Coing 1982: 253-258.
15 Waider 1961: 61.
16 Idem 54-58.
17 Coing 1982: 254.
18 Giltaij 2011: 26.
19 D 1 5 4; Waider 1961: 60 n 59. See, also, Schrage 1975.
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to dignitas” is protected by the actio iniuriarum as would have made sense based – 
for instance – on D 47 10 1 2, he uses the term existimatio and refers to a text by a 
Roman jurist called Callistratus in D 50 13 5 1.20
1 2 Research question
The reference is telling with regard to the role of personality rights such as dignity in 
the system Donellus creates. With the specific definition of existimatio as a “position 
of unimpaired dignitas, which is established by law and custom”, Donellus intends 
to formulate a right to dignity and consequently also to life, body and freedom with 
a, for lack of a better word, “natural” character, that is rights that every person has 
regardless of his legal status. But this appears to be only exemplary for the sixteenth 
century conception of the relation between individual and state based on the 
individual’s “inalienable” personality rights. To be clear, I am using the sixteenth-
century jurist Donellus here as a tool to clarify a particular problem for Roman law, 
without suggesting whether he is of any value for the content of the Roman legal 
sources as such. But still, does the conception of Donellus say something about the 
content and meaning of the Roman legal text itself? Did the Roman jurists intend 
to formulate a “right to human dignity” relatively independent of social status or 
circumstance with the term existimatio, as Donellus would centuries later? And 
what is the exact relation between the terms dignitas and existimatio in the Roman 
sources?
2  EXISTIMATIO IN THE LATE REPUBLIC AND EARLY 
EMPIRE
If we look at the use of the term “existimatio” in the sources of the late Republic 
and early Empire, it designates exclusively something along the lines of “standing 
in society”.21 This standing, or perhaps rather “image” in modern terminology,22 
could be violated by rumours and bad press or by an individual’s own misconduct.23 
As such, magistrates24 and, later, emperors,25 possessed existimatio, which could 
be violated dictum factumve, as Suetonius states. Various authors point to a close 
relation between existimatio and infamia as its negative counterpart.26 With regard to 
the Roman legal sources, in his work on the place and role of infamia in Roman law, 
20 Waider 1961: 60 n 60; Donellus Commentarii de iure civili (1589) 2 8 3 at 229.
21 Yavetz 1974: 39.
22 Ibid.
23 Yavetz 1974: 45; cf Cic Planc 6.
24 For example, Cic Verr 2 60; Yavetz 1974: 38-45.
25 Suet Iul 75; Suet Tib 58; Yavetz 1974: 47.
26 Yavetz 1974: 31 and infra.
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Greenidge devoted a chapter to the meaning of the term existimatio. According to 
Greenidge, both dignitas and existimatio denote a concept of “civil honour”.27 This 
can be seen, for instance, in Cicero Pro Quinctio 15, where Cicero states that when 
under the Edict of the praetor someone’s goods had been seized, also his fama and 
existimatio are taken away: thus, infamia could to a degree be seen as meaning laesa 
existimatio, though we cannot be certain whether this truly entailed a legal measure, 
a form of moral censure, or merely a Ciceronian rhetorical flourish.28
In the sense of “civil honour” or “reputation”, the term often props up in the legal 
texts, mainly with regard to the existimatio of tutors29 and witnesses.30 Furthermore, 
at some point, the violation of existimatio as well as dignitas came to be punished 
by means of an actio iniuriarum. Kaser suggests this was done under the Edict 
rubric ne quid infamandi causa fiat,31 due to the connection between existimatio 
and infamia.32 In a concrete sense an individual’s existimatio could be violated by 
a libellus famosus, a verbal or written insult, which was punishable both under 
iniuria in the Edict as well as the lex Cornelia de iniuriis.33 As such, iniuria as a 
delict sanctioning transgressions against someone else’s existimatio could be traced 
back as far as Labeo or even earlier in the late Republic.34 A more direct connection 
between iniuria and existimatio can be seen in D 47 10 1 4 and D 47 10 1 6:35
D 47 10 1 4 Ulpianus Libro 56 ad edictum: Et si forte cadaveri defuncti fit iniuria, cui heredes 
bonorumve possessores exstitimus, iniuriarum nostro nomine habemus actionem: spectat 
enim ad existimationem nostram, si qua ei fiat iniuria. Idemque et si fama eius, cui heredes 
exstitimus, lacessatur. (And if perchance the corpse should be contumeliously treated of a 
deceased to whom we are heirs or recipients of his estate, we have the action for insult in our 
own right; for it affects our own reputation, if any insult be directed at the corpse. The same 
applies if the good repute of one to whom we are heirs be damaged.36)
D 47 10 16 Ulpianus Libro 56 ad edictum: Quotiens autem funeri testatoris vel cadaveri fit 
iniuria, si quidem post aditam hereditatem fiat, dicendum est heredi quodammodo factam 
(semper enim heredis interest defuncti existimationem purgare) … (Now whenever there be 
any affront at the testator’s funeral or to his corpse, if it occurs after the inheritance has been 
accepted, it must be said that in a sense, the insult is to the heir [for it is always the heir’s 
obligation to vindicate the reputation of the deceased] …)
27 Greenidge 1894: 2.
28 Idem 19.
29 Idem 5 n 2; idem 189ff; Brasiello 1937: 549; D 26 10 4 2.
30 Brasiello 1937: 552.
31 Lenel 1956: 323 n 193.
32 Kaser 1956: 222-223.
33 See the texts in Kaser 1956: 223 n 18 (iniuria) and n 19 (lex Cornelia de iniuriis).
34 Made explicit in various texts of post-classical jurists: Brasiello 1937: 547; Hagemann 1998: 137-
138.
35 Kaser 1956: 231 n 58.
36 Translations from the Digest are by Watson.
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The heirs to an estate may bring an actio iniuriarum under their own name when 
the body of the deceased has been violated, because this violation both concerns 
the existimatio of the deceased and the existimatio of the heirs. This concept 
of existimatio is close to the one argued by Greenidge, more “civil honour” than 
“human dignity”. But seeing the connection between existimatio and infamia, it goes 
to wonder whether a violation of existimatio is implied in other parts of the Edict 
rubric on iniuria or even with regard to other actiones famosae, carrying the punitive 
measure of infamia.37 However, according to Kaser, existimatio in the context of the 
Edict is not used by the jurists in a technical legal sense.38 The same goes for the 
notion of existimatio in D 50 13 5, the text referred to by Donellus some 1300 years 
later in his formulation of a personal right to dignity.39
3 D 50 13 5 AND THE LIBRI DE COGNITIONIBUS
The late-classical jurist Callistratus40 writes his text in the context of a larger manual 
on the cognitio-procedure.41 The text primarily regards a loose subdivision of the 
genera of the procedure based on the punishment the trial would lead to:
D 50 13 5pr Callistratus Libro primo de cognitionibus: Cognitionum numerus cum ex variis 
causis descendat, in genera dividi facile non potest, nisi summatim dividatur. Numerus ergo 
cognitionum in quattuor fere genera dividi potest: aut enim de honoribus sive muneribus 
gerendis agitatur, aut de re pecuniaria disceptatur, aut de existimatione alicuius cognoscitur, 
aut de capitali crimine quaeritur. (The number of judicial examinations, since it arises from 
various causes, cannot easily be divided into categories, unless this is done schematically. 
But the number of judicial examinations can perhaps be divided into four categories; for it 
is either a question of the undertaking of offices and munera, or of property, or of someone’s 
status, or of a capital offence.)
In the principium, the cognitio-trial is subdivided into four genera: Regarding the 
administration of offices, regarding pecuniary matters, regarding existimatio and 
concerning capital offences.42 Although the need for these kinds of manuals is easy 
to see in the context of a cognitio-trial after the degradation of the legal framework 
that existed in the late Republic and early Empire, the exact nature of the separation 
between trials regarding pecuniary matters, existimatio and capital offences remains 
summatim, as Callistratus himself describes it. For instance, following Cicero Pro 
Quinctio 15, a judgment based on the Edict could concern both a pecuniary matter 
as well as the existimatio of the condemned, even though Callistratus puts it under 
37 Kaser 1956: 251; cf, eg, D 50 17 104; Kaser 1956: 233 n 58.
38 Idem 231 n 58.
39 Idem 234, 264ff.
40 For biographical information on the jurist, see Bonini 1964: 11-21; Kunkel 1967: 235 no 61.
41 Lenel 1887-1889: vol 1 cols 80-94; Kaser 1956: 264-265; Bonini 1964: 29ff.
42 Brasiello 1937: 554-558; Bonini 1964: 32ff; Liebs 1966: 263.
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the heading of trial regarding existimatio in D 50 13 5 3. Also, the relation between 
infamia in the Edict of the praetor and infamia as the result of committing a capital 
offence in any of the stages of development of Roman law hardly follows the neat 
distinction suggested by Callistratus.43 In any case, the jurist goes on to treat the 
cognitio-trial regarding someone’s existimatio:
D 50 13 5 1 Callistratus Libro primo de cognitionibus: Existimatio est dignitatis inlaesae 
status, legibus ac moribus comprobatus, qui ex delicto nostro auctoritate legum aut minuitur 
aut consumitur. (Status is a position of unimpaired standing, which is established by law and 
custom and under the authority of the laws may be reduced or removed by our delict.)
Thus we come to the definition of existimatio also referred to by Donellus in the 
construction of his right to human dignity in the sixteenth century. Existimatio is, 
in the Watson-translation, primarily defined as “a position of unimpaired standing, 
which is established by law and custom”. On the basis of this text, Greenidge draws 
a parallel between existimatio and caput in Roman law, where existimatio has a 
moral as well as a legal dimension.44 However, as Kaser points out, the comparison 
is somewhat flawed because the diminution of caput or capitis deminutio is a proper 
legally subscribed sanction, contrary to infamia as it seems to be referred to in the 
latter part of the text.45 As such, infamia as laesa existimatio has more in common 
with the Republican nota censoria, a punitive administrative measure issued by 
the censor on moral grounds,46 only in this case applied by the magistrates in the 
cognitio-trial. Yet, the scope of this laesa existimatio is much greater than a mere 
moral sanction or even a moral punitive measure with legal consequences such as 
infamia. This becomes apparent from D 50 13 5 2-3:
Callistratus Libro primo de cognitionibus: (2) Minuitur existimatio, quotiens manente 
libertate circa statum dignitatis poena plectimur: sicuti cum relegatur quis vel cum ordine 
movetur vel cum prohibetur honoribus publicis fungi vel cum plebeius fustibus caeditur vel 
in opus publicum datur vel cum in eam causam quis incidit, quae edicto perpetuo infamiae 
causa enumeratur. (3) Consumitur vero, quotiens magna capitis minutio intervenit, id est 
cum libertas adimitur: veluti cum aqua et igni interdicitur, quae in persona deportatorum 
evenit, vel cum plebeius in opus metalli vel in metallum datur: nihil enim refert, nec diversa 
poena est operis et metalli, nisi quod refugae operis non morte, sed poena metalli subiciuntur. 
(2) Status is reduced if we are assigned a penalty which affects our standing, although liberty 
remains, as, for instance, if someone is banished or removed from the ordo or debarred from 
holding public office or if a plebeian is beaten with rods or assigned to forced labor or if 
anyone falls under any heading which is listed in the perpetual edict as bringing infamy. (3) 
Status is removed if magna capitis deminutio occurs, that is, if deprivation of liberty occurs, 
as, for instance, if someone is forbidden fire and water, which occurs when he is deported or 
43 Mommsen 1899: 995 n 2; Greenidge 1894: 154-170; Kaser 1956: 254-263.
44 Greenidge 1894: 5-8.
45 Kaser 1956: 266 n 22.
46 Greenidge 1894: 41-112, esp 60-74; Giltaij 2011: 55-61.
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if a plebeian is assigned mine work or to a mine; for it makes no difference, nor is there any 
distinction between a public work and a mine, except that those who escape from a public 
work are punished not by death, but by assignment to a mine.)
Based on the text, the diminution of existimatio in a cognitio-trial is synonymous 
with a panoply of penalties, such as exile, exclusion from certain magistracies, 
whipping, forced labour and praetorian infamia. Moreover, the complete loss of 
existimatio as well as libertas occurs when someone is sentenced by aqua et ignis 
interdictio to deportation or a plebeian to forced labour in the mines. Even though 
the character of the laesa existimatio and capitis deminutio may differ, it is telling 
that Callistratus calls the latter condition a capitis deminutio magna, by loss of 
factual liberty or possibly even the status libertatis encompassing both the legal 
capitis deminutio media and maxima.47 When existimatio in the late Republic and 
the early Empire meant “civil honour”, it is clear that the notion of existimatio that 
Callistratus refers to in this text, namely the existimatio diminished or even lost by 
these sentences, goes far beyond “reputation”. Looking at the penalties, these range 
from losing civic privileges to corporal punishment and that which could easily be 
seen as punishments akin to the death penalty. Then the question is, what does this 
text say about the “positive” implications of the notion of existimatio in Roman law?
Kaser states that existimatio in this text is not simply an individual condition 
of being legally untouched by infamia, but rather human dignity in a general sense, 
transgressed upon by the catalogue of penalties.48 If this is the case, existimatio 
would mean human dignity on a very basic level, entailing the integrity of life and 
limb as well as reputation, and relatively independent from rank compared to the 
notion of dignitas, seeing plebeians and possibly even slaves have an existimatio that 
is affected by the punishment.49 Callistratus confirms this reading when he revisits 
the penalties regarding existimatio in the sixth book of his Libri de cognitionibus 
dealing with capital punishment:50
D 8 19 28 1 Callistratus Libro sexto de cognitionibus: Ceterae poenae ad existimationem, 
non ad capitis periculum pertinent, veluti relegatio ad tempus, vel in perpetuum, vel in 
insulam, vel cum in opus quis publicum datur, vel cum fustium ictu subicitur. (The remaining 
47 Kaser 1956: 265; cf Gai Inst 1 160 and 161.
48 Kaser 1956: 266: “Für unserer Zweck ist vielmehr nur wesentlich daß die existimatio, von der 
hier die Rede ist, nicht einfach die juristische Unbescholtenheit im Gegensatz zum Infamie ist, 
sondern in einem viel allgemeiner Sinn der Zustand unverletzten Menschenwürde, der durch alle 
aufgezählten Strafen von der Relegation bis zur Bergwerkstrafe geschmälert wird”; see, also, 
Bonini 1964: 37. Like Waldron 2012: 48-50, I use “human dignity” here in a very legal sense, 
meaning as a form of protection against degrading treatment as it occurs in various international 
treaties and constitutional documents nowadays.
49 This depends on reading D 49 19 28 2-5 as a single text, all dealing with punishments affecting 
existimatio. Slaves are referred to in D 49 19 28 4. Lenel (1887-1889) reads them as subsequent: 
vol 1 cols 91-92.
50 Lenel 1887-1889: vol 1 cols 91-94, col 91 no 42; Mommsen 1899: 908-909; Bonini 1964: 86-90.
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punishments relate to a person’s reputation, not to the risk of his caput, such as relegation, for 
a period or permanently, or to an island, or when someone is handed over to forced labor, or 
punished by beating with rods [tr Watson cs]).
Apart from D 50 13 5 and D 48 19 28, the function and content of the concept of 
existimatio in Callistratus remains rather unclear. Only one other text from the libri 
de cognitionibus appears to concern the loss of existimatio as a penalty specifically:51
D 48 19 26 Callistratus Libro primo de cognitionibus: Crimen vel poena paterna nullam 
maculam filio infligere potest: namque unusquisque ex suo admisso sorti subicitur nec alieni 
criminis successor constituitur, idque divi fratres Hierapolitanis rescripserunt. (The crime or 
punishment of the father cannot inflict any stain on the son; for each individual suffers his 
fate for his own crime, nor is he made the successor to the offence of another; as the deified 
brothers wrote in a rescript to the citizens of Hierapolis [tr Watson cs]).
However, contrary to what Bonini states,52 the text seems to regard the trials regarding 
munera rather than the trials concerning existimatio, both to be found in the first 
book of the Libri de cognitionibus.53 The “stain” mentioned in the text would have 
been important as an impairment – whether in the guise of infamia or not – for the 
son to take office, and thus Callistratus and the Divi Fratres before him made it clear 
that a son does not inherit the crime his father committed.54 In any case, even though 
the text is taken from the first book, it does not shed a great deal of light on the nature 
and function of the trials regarding the existimatio of the suspect.
4  THE NOTION OF EXISTIMATIO IN THE LATE-
CLASSICAL ROMAN LEGAL SOURCES
4 1 The scope of existimatio
There are, however, plenty of examples of the genus of the trials regarding existimatio 
in later legal texts, primarily imperial constitutions.55 According to Brasiello, late-
classical jurists such as Callistratus had aimed to create a new genre of trial and 
punishment within the cognitio-procedure. These poenae or iudicia existimationis 
were to stand between pecuniary and capital punishment, and regarded any 
(cognitio-)trial in which the moral integrity of the accused was in question.56 Ulpian, 
for example, uses the notion in the seventh book of his De officio proconsulis with 
regard to rescripts of Trajan to his provincial governors:57
51 Lenel 1887-1889: vol 1 cols 84-85 nos 10-11; Von Lübtow 1948: 512-513; Bonini 1964: 51-52.
52 Bonini 1964: 52.
53 Lenel 1887-1889: vol 1 cols 81-85.
54 Greenidge 1894: 209-213.
55 Brasiello 1937: 561.
56 Idem 550; Cic Q Rosc 6 16. See, also, Yavetz 1974: 37-40.
57 Coenraad 2000: 134-141; Nogrady 2006: 112-125.
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D 48 19 5pr Ulpianus Libro septimo de officio proconsulis: Absentem in criminibus damnari 
non debere divus Traianus Iulio Frontoni rescripsit. Sed nec de suspicionibus debere 
aliquem damnari divus Traianus Adsidio Severo rescripsit: satius enim esse impunitum 
relinqui facinus nocentis quam innocentem damnari. Adversus contumaces vero, qui neque 
denuntiationibus neque edictis praesidum obtemperassent, etiam absentes pronuntiari 
oportet secundum morem privatorum iudiciorum. Potest quis defendere haec non esse 
contraria. Quid igitur est? Melius statuetur in absentes pecuniarias quidem poenas vel eas, 
quae existimationem contingunt, si saepius admoniti per contumaciam desint, statui posse et 
usque ad relegationem procedi: verum si quid gravius irrogandum fuisset, puta in metallum 
vel capitis poenam, non esse absentibus irrogandam. (The deified Trajan wrote in a rescript 
to Julius Fronto that in criminal cases a person should not be condemned in his absence. He 
also wrote in a rescript to Adsidius Severus that neither ought a person to be condemned 
on suspicion; for it was preferable that the crime of a guilty man should go unpunished 
than an innocent man be condemned. However, judgment ought to be pronounced against 
contumacious persons who fail to comply with the summonses or edicts of the governors, 
even in their absence, after the manner of private actions. It is possible to maintain that these 
principles are not contradictory; what, then, is the answer? It will be better to lay down 
that penalties involving money or affecting a person’s reputation can be imposed on absent 
persons if, after frequent warnings, they fail [to appear] through contumacy, and this may go 
as far as relegation; but if there is any heavier penalty to be imposed, let us say condemnation 
to the mines or capital punishment, it must not be imposed on the absent [tr Watson cs]).
The subdivision made by Callistratus in trials regarding pecuniary matters, trials 
concerning existimatio and trials regarding capital offences is quite clearly present 
in this text. Pecuniary penalties or punishment regarding the existimatio of a suspect 
can be imposed even when the party is absent, while the presence of the accused 
is required when harsher measures are in order. It is interesting to note that while 
Callistratus classifies “hard labour” as a loss of existimatio, to Ulpian metallum 
is more akin to capital punishment.58 Both jurists do, however, state relegation as 
a penalty affecting existimatio: Since the Libri de cognitionibus were probably 
composed around AD 19759 and De officio proconsulis at least after AD 212,60 it 
might be fair to say that Ulpian took his subdivision and concept of existimatio for 
the larger part from Callistratus.61 However, Liebs suggests a precursor in Venuleius 
Saturninus De iudiciis publicis.62 In any case, seeing that Callistratus devotes separate 
books to the discussion of the various kinds of trial, the seventh book of Ulpian’s De 
officio proconsulis may also have contained texts relevant specifically to the notion 
of existimatio.
Most of the texts in book 7 of De officio proconsulis appear to concern 
punishments and matters closely related to the penalty,63 and the persona and 
58 Coenraad 2000: 138-139 (meaning the death penalty).
59 Bonini 1964: 15; Liebs 1966: 257.
60 See, eg, Honoré 2002: 184.
61 Bonini 1964: 29-31; Liebs 1966: 262.
62 Liebs 1966: 262.
63 Lenel 1887-1889: vol 2 col 973 no 2180, col 977 no 2201; Nogrady 2006: 40-41.
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dignitas of the accused are referred to explicitly in several texts, for instance in D 48 
13 7(6) 2 regarding the punishment for the crimen de peculatu.64 However, the term 
“existimatio” is not used in any of the other texts taken from the seventh book of 
De officio proconsulis. When Ulpian does use the term once again, he does so in his 
commentary on the lex Iulia et Papia:65
D 50 16 131 1 Ulpianus Libro tertio ad legem Iuliam et Papiam: Inter “multam” autem et 
“poenam” multum interest, cum poena generale sit nomen omnium delictorum coercitio, 
multa specialis peccati, cuius animadversio hodie pecuniaria est: poena autem non tantum 
pecuniaria, verum capitis et existimationis irrogari solet.   Et multa quidem ex arbitrio 
eius venit, qui multam dicit: poena non irrogatur, nisi quae quaque lege vel quo alio iure 
specialiter huic delicto imposita est: quin immo multa ibi dicitur, ubi specialis poena non 
est imposita. Item multam is dicere potest, cui iudicatio data est: magistratus solos et 
praesides provinciarum posse multam dicere mandatis permissum est. Poenam autem 
unusquisque inrogare potest, cui huius criminis sive delicti exsecutio competit. (But there is 
a considerable difference between a “fine” and a “penalty”, since a penalty is a general name 
for the punishment of all delicts, a fine is tied to a misdemeanor, whose punishment today is 
in monetary form. But a penalty is not only of monetary form, but may be capital or involve 
status. And, indeed, a fine arises from the judgment of a man who pronounces the fine. A 
penalty is not imposed, except that which is laid down especially for the delict in question by 
each law or some other provision. So a fine is pronounced in cases where a special penalty is 
not laid down. Likewise, a man who possesses jurisdiction can pronounce fines. But anyone 
to whom the prosecution of the offence or delict in question falls can impose a penalty.)
Callistratus’s subdivision can be read in this text as well, although it is made 
subordinate to the difference between a multa and a poena, the former being a 
pecuniary penalty, the latter also affecting the caput and existimatio of the accused. 
The text appears to have a more theoretical character: According to Ulpian, a poena 
regarding the existimatio of the accused can only be imposed if this is prescribed by 
a law or some other authority, and furthermore, only those who possess iurisdictio 
may inflict such a penalty. As such, it appears penalties regarding existimatio were 
reserved for rather specific transgressions, even though as with D 50 13 5 and D 48 
19 5 it remains unclear which transgressions Callistratus and Ulpian have in mind 
exactly. It stands to reason these are the transgressions to which previously infamia 
as a punitive measure had been appended. Important in listing these transgressions 
is emphasising that at least from the third century onwards, this measure could be 
appended somewhat equally to transgressions both in public and private criminal 
law.66 This may have had something to do with the integration of various types of 
procedure into the cognitio-trial, but does not necessarily have to follow from it.67
64 Nogrady 2006: 126-136, esp 133-134.
65 Also, Modestinus in D 50 16 103; Mommsen 1899: 907.
66 Macer in D 48 1 7; Mommsen 1899: 996-998; Kaser 1956: 269.
67 Mommsen 1899: 997; Liebs 1966: 258-263.
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4 2 The possible origin of existimatio
Kaser provides a list of these transgressions,68 among which violations of tutela, 
fiducia and societas69 as well as iniuria70 due to an earlier connection with the term 
existimatio catches the eye immediately. To this list we may add other various other 
non-capital crimina as Brasiello does.71 However, even though Callistratus and 
Ulpian may have had specific transgressions in mind, from the sources no direct 
connection stemming from the use of infamia as a punitive measure between the 
iudicia existimationis and specific transgressions either in the Libri de cognitionibus72 
or book 7 of De officio proconsulis can be argued decisively. For instance, in the 
seventh book of De officio proconsulis, the crimen laesio maiestatis and the crimen 
de sicariis et veneficiis are stated. To these crimes, infamia was not in any obvious 
way attached, and should be seen on the whole as “capital” crimes.73 In general, 
the problem in this regard is the measure in which infamia and existimatio in their 
“technical” meaning in the context of these transgressions in the cognitio-trial are 
related to “non-technical” infamia and existimatio as they occur in D 50 13 5 and 
its related texts.74 With regard to the “non-technical” concept of existimatio, Kaser 
refers to an origin in rhetoric.75 Perhaps we can see an early example of this rhetorical 
use of the term in Papinian:76
D 28 7 15 Papinianus Libro sexto decimo quaestionum: Filius, qui fuit in potestate, sub 
condicione scriptus heres, quam senatus aut princeps improbant, testamentum infirmet patris, 
ac si condicio non esset in eius potestate: nam quae facta laedunt pietatem existimationem 
verecundiam nostram et, ut generaliter dixerim, contra bonos mores fiunt, nec facere nos 
posse credendum est. (A son who was in parental power, appointed heir under a condition 
which the senate or the emperor disapproves, may upset his father’s will, as if the condition 
were one not in his power [to fulfill]; for any acts which offend our sense of duty, our 
reputation, or our sense of shame, and, if I might speak generally, which are done against 
sound morals, it is not to be accepted that we are even able to do.)
But apart from this text, the origin of the term existimatio as it is used by Callistratus 
in D 50 13 5 is not clear. Kaser refers mainly to Cicero Pro Caecina 100,77 but 
the text does not contain the term existimatio as such. Moreover, we have already 
68 Kaser 1956: 267 n 225.
69 Cicero, Pro Q Roscio Comoedo 6 16.
70 D 47 10 4 1/6.
71 Brasiello 1937: 547-561; Mommsen 1899: 996-998.
72 Lenel 1887-1889: vol 1 cols 90-91; Bonini 1964: 141-149.
73 Lenel 1887-1889: vol 2 cols 975-977.
74 Kaser 1956: 231 n 58.
75 Idem 267.
76 Babusiaux 2011: 236-238. See, also, Marcus Aurelius in Callistratus Libro quinto de cognitionibus 
D 48 7 7; Bonini 1964: 125-128.
77 Kaser 1956: 267.
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seen that existimatio in the sources of the late Republic and early Empire means 
“reputation” or “civil honour” exclusively. This appears to be no different in the 
rhetorical treatises.78 Therefore, there does not seem to be a logical precursor to the 
concept of existimatio as it is stated by Callistratus in the Latin texts.
It should, however, not be forgotten there is some reason to suppose an 
oriental, possibly Greek, background to Callistratus’s life and work.79 Apart from 
quoting several rescripts in Greek to cities in the eastern provinces,80 in his Libri de 
cognitionibus Callistratus provides a substantial reference to the Greek text of Plato’s 
Politeia, the only Plato-reference in the whole of the Digest.81 Even though this does 
not prove that Callistratus lived and worked in a predominantly Greek-speaking part 
of the Empire, it does show a rather profound interest in Greek culture. Moreover, 
it should be noted at this point that the penal theories of Plato had somewhat of 
a “Nachleben” in the second century AD Roman sources, for instance in a large 
discussion in Aulus Gellius.82 As such, Callistratus could have constructed his concept 
of existimatio and the poenae existimationis from Greek or oriental legal examples 
or even Greek philosophical texts. According to Yavetz, the Greek equivalents of 
existimatio are axioma (ἀξίωμα), doxa (δόξα) and eudoxia (εὐδοξία).83 First of all, it 
is interesting to see all three Greek terms as they are used mainly in a philosophical 
context have the same double meaning of “opinion” and “reputation” existimatio 
has in the Latin legal and literary sources.84 It is this double meaning of εὐδοξία that 
Socrates plays with in Plato’s Menoon.85 This platonic usage of δόξα/εὐδοξία has 
been adopted by the Stoics in particular.86 In the Stoic sources, δόξα/εὐδοξία carries 
an ethical connotation as a (preferred) ἀδιάφορον or indifferens, those goods which 
are preferable to have but are not necessary to lead a “life according to nature”.87
In the sense of an ἀδιάφορον, existimatio appears to occur in the Latin sources 
as well, for example in Seneca and later in Aulus Gellius.88 Seeing then that various 
authors have argued a relation between the development of the notion of persona in 
Roman law and Stoic ethical doctrine, it is interesting to assess whether Callistratus 
perhaps made use of the ἀδιάφορον δόξα or εὐδοξία in the formulation of his concept 
of existimatio. From the era of Callistratus, that is to say the second century AD, 
78 For example, Cic De or 2 184 and Sen Controv 2 7.
79 Bonini 1964: 12-13; Kunkel 1967: 235.
80 D 50 6 5; D 8 3 16; Bonini 1964: 70, 153-167.
81 D 50 11 2 from the Politeia; Lenel 1887-1889: vol 1 col 86 no 21; Bonini 1964: 75-76.
82 Gell NA 20 1; Robinson 2007: 179-195.
83 Yavetz 1974: 52 n 48.
84 For example, regarding ἀξίωμα SVF 2 5 no 13, SVF 2 60 no 186 and SVF 2 61 no 188; and Rist 
1982: 145.
85 Pl Menoon 99a-99b; Weiss 2001: 164.
86 Long & Sedley 1987b: 349-351.
87 Reesor 1951: 102-110; Pohlenz 1992: 120-123; Rist 1969: 102-105; Long 1974: 192-199; Long 
& Sedley 1987a: 354-359.
88 Sen Ep 95 58; Gell NA 18 1.
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there are two texts from the Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta dealing with δόξα as 
an ἀδιάφορον, which are both from neoplatonic sources hostile to Stoicism. In De 
stoicorum repugnantis, Plutarch refers to a remark made by Chrysippus, who may 
have argued for rhetoricians to pretend for political purposes matters such as wealth or 
δόξα are proper in the ethical sense.89 Also, Sextus Empiricus in his diatribe Adversus 
mathematicos gives a rather detailed description of the Stoic doctrine of “preferred” 
indifferents, among which δόξα is mentioned.90 Yet, the depth and complexity of 
Callistratus’s conception of existimatio as something that can be violated by a 
penalty handed out by a magistrate is carried by neither of these texts. Moreover, it 
is not clear whether δόξα or existimatio in the ethical doctrine of the Stoics in general 
could even be seen as something as fundamental as “human dignity”, and intends 
to state more than reputation or “civil honour”. On the other hand, notwithstanding 
their character and role as “indifferents”, the Stoic ἀδιάφορα also entail health and 
strength, matters pertaining to the condition of the human being as such.
5 CONCLUSION
So, where does the notion of existimatio as “human dignity” as formulated by 
Callistratus come from? Firstly, the possibility must be stated that Callistratus 
himself invented this notion and its procedural consequences in the Roman law of 
his time, and that this notion was taken over and adapted by the jurists Ulpian and 
Modestinus. This establishes Callistratus, of whom we know comparatively little, as 
a highly influential and original thinker, even though neither Ulpian nor Modestinus 
quotes him directly in any text. Since there is no logical precursor to Callistratus’s 
notion of existimatio, at least not in an obvious way present in the Roman legal or 
Greek philosophical sources, or, to my knowledge, Greek law or Christian theology, 
we have to assume he himself constructed this notion and the procedure surrounding 
it. Then, the remarkable conclusion to this article must be that, considering the 
Donellus-quotation, one of the first precursors of the idea of “human dignity” as a 
right is an otherwise almost completely unknown jurist from the second century AD, 
whose work we only know now inasmuch as we do due to historical circumstance 
upon historical accident.
There is, however, another possibility. Crifò has shown a prevalence of neo-
platonic ideas in the works of Ulpian due to the influence of the circle of Julia 
Domna, the wife of the emperor Septimius Severus.91 Instead of Ulpian taking his 
cue from Callistratus, both Callistratus and Ulpian could have constructed the notion 
of existimatio as “human dignity” from the same source. Seeing the neo-platonic 
influence on Ulpian and the Plato-citation in Callistratus, this might very well be 
89 Reesor 1951: 104; Plut De stoicorum repugnantis 1034b (SVF 3 175 no 698).
90 Sext Emp Math 11 59 (SVF 3 29 no 122).
91 Crifò 1976: 734-736ff; also, Honoré 2002: 80-82.
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a source with a (neo-)platonic character. The possible character of existimatio as a 
Stoic ἀδιάφορον is then explained through the integration of Stoic notions in platonic 
thought in the late second century AD.92 In other words, the notion of existimatio as 
stated by Callistratus could be a combination or integration of the platonic theories 
of state and punishment and a Stoic conception of dignity or even “human dignity” 
as an ἀδιάφορον. For this, to my knowledge, a singular source in which these 
elements are combined before Callistratus is lacking, but all the elements separately 
are certainly present in one place, for instance in Aulus Gellius.
Finally, even without any absolute knowledge on the origin of the notion of 
existimatio in Callistratus, the context and the usage in and of itself have some 
fascinating implications. The construction of “human dignity” as something the 
Roman “state” may only violate by means of a punishment handed out in a trial, 
almost as if it were a right in the modern sense, is something we would expect in 
a seventeenth or eighteenth century political treatise, not in the works of a second 
century AD resident of the Roman empire. So how does the notion of existimatio in 
the late-classical legal sources fit into the modern debate on the origins of human 
dignity? With Waldron, for existimatio to qualify as a type of human dignity, we need 
to ask ourselves if a “levelling-up” has taken place, in the sense of privileges being 
accorded more equally than before the formulation of the notion. Although I would 
say there are definite similarities between existimatio as employed by Callistratus 
and “human dignity” as it occurs in the modern constitutions of Germany and South-
Africa, particularly in its practical application in criminal law, we lack the historical 
detail to determine this with any kind of certainty.
The problem here is mainly the role existimatio has in the work of Callistratus, 
namely as a systematising notion rather than an ethical one. Still, even taking this 
purpose into account, the relative independency of existimatio from notions of rank 
and status is a noteworthy aspect of this definition, specifically compared to dignitas 
as it occurs in the Roman legal sources. Moreover, the conclusion must still be that 
the notion of existimatio as formulated by Callistratus speaks for the presence of 
ideas of state and individual already among the Roman jurists, if only to the point 
of there being a divide between the two. Whether or not this was a part of a larger 
theory on the persona in Roman law or whether or not this persona was comprised 
of Stoic ἀδιάφορα, Callistratus’s conception of existimatio tells us something about 
the way in which Roman jurists thought about what makes a person a person. For 
several Roman jurists, dignity consists of more than reputation, and in a way is more 
basic than that: It is also the absence of pain, suffering, humiliation and compulsion, 
and as such an equal part of every person, whatever his position in society might be.
92 In Plotinus and Porphyry: Wallis 1972: 82-84; Smith 1987: 762; Dombrovski 1987: 776-778 etc.
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ABSTRACT
Even though there are similarities between the two notions, in antiquity the term 
dignitas generally speaking does not have the same meaning as our modern idea 
of “human dignity”. However, there is a possibility that for “human dignity” some 
Roman jurists actually used a term different from dignitas, namely existimatio. This 
article examines whether the term existimatio in the work of one Roman jurist in 
particular may be seen as akin to our modern conception of “human dignity”, and, if 
so, what the scope and origin of existimatio in the late-classical Roman legal sources 
were.
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